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Abstract:  
The paper explores the effects of shadow economy on tax revenues, in the case of several 
African countries, based on a panel-model approach. The data-set covers the period 1999-
2007. The main results reveal that the shadow economy has a significant and negative impact 
on tax revenues. In other word, when the shadow economy tends to extend, the level of tax 
revenues decreases. These outputs show that the African governments, in order to maximise 
the collected tax revenues, should better “control” the shadow economy phenomenon. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The preference for shadow economy area becomes a complex and destructive economic 
phenomenon, which has intensively monopolised the attention of economists in the last 
decade of years. Defined by Smith (1994, p. 18) as “the market-based production of goods 
and services, whether legal or illegal, that escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP”, 
the shadow economy has been the main topic on G8 Summit agenda in June 2013. 
There are many studies which investigate the shadow economy. The first one focuses on 
determinants of shadow economy, while the second one investigates its consequence in the 
economic and social environment. 
Schneider (2005b) splits the determinants of shadow economy in two main groups. The first 
group includes the tax and social security burdens. The connection between shadow economy 
and taxation is intensively investigated by Schneider (2000) and Johnson et al. (1998). They 
find a significant influence of taxation on shadow economy, the variables heaving the same 
sign. Similar outputs obtain Kirchgässner (1984) in the case of Germany and Klovland (1984) 
for Norway and Sweden, respectively. The second group of investigations traits the intensity 
of regulation as potential explanatory factor for shadow economy and state that the political 
spectrum can affect formal and informal economic activities. Some contributions in this field 
offer researchers, such as: Levin and Satarov (2000), Bird et al. (2006) and Dreher and 
Schneider (2006).  
The implications of shadow economy on economic and social environment are the second 
exploring direction of studies. According to this field, any extension of shadow economy lead 
to a decrease of official tax base, heaving the same impact direction on collect tax revenues. 
Moreover, these reduced tax receipts determine a low quality and quantity of public goods 
and services. On long term, the government need supplementary tax resources and raises the 
level of tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector. 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of shadow economy on tax revenues, based on a 
panel-model approach. The data-set includes several countries from Africa and covers the 
period 1999-2007. The main results reveal that the shadow economy has a significant and 
negative impact on tax revenues. In other word, when the shadow economy tends to extend, 
the level of tax revenues decreases.  
Unfortunately, there are few contributions on this topic. For example, Schneider (2005b) 
estimates the level of shadow economy in 110 countries, including developing, transition and 
developed OECD economies. Beside these predictions, the author states that the ”An increase 
in the size of the shadow economy can lead to reduced state revenues, which in turn reduces 
the quality and quantity of publicly provided goods and services. Ultimately, this can lead to 
an increase in tax rates for firms and individuals in the official sector,...” Schneider (2005, p. 
602). Hence, if the shadow economy increases, tax revenues reduce on short term and 
increases on log term. Other studies have relevance on the public finance topic. For example, 
Nicolini (1998) performs and tests a simple monetary model to investigate the effects of tax 
evasion on the optimal inflation tax. Based on this approach, the inflation can be an indirect 
resort of taxing the shadow economy. Cavalcanti and Villamil (2004) study the optimal 
inflation tax in economies with structural imperfections in labour, commodity and currency 
markets. The main output of this analysis shows that when the structural imperfections exist, 
such as the informal sector, the optimal inflation tax is positive. In this case, the shadow 
economy is positively correlated with the taxes. Similar results offers Koreschkova (2006), 
employing a quantitative analysis of inflation as a tax on the underground economy. She finds 
that, at a given level shadow economy, in the case of US, the government finances its public 
expenditures using an optimal mix of the income tax rate and the inflation rate. If these 
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investigations follow a normative approach, Mazhar and Méon (2012), for the first time, tests 
empirically the size of the shadow economy increases under the influence of taxes and 
inflation. The sample includes developed and developing countries and covers the period 
1999-2007. The authors find that the tax burden is negatively correlated with the size of the 
shadow economy, while the inflation and the size of the shadow economy have the same sign. 
Given this poor empirical literature in the area of shadow economy - tax nexus, the present 
paper extends the literature in the field by focusing on the shadow economy implications on 
tax revenues and finds new evidences regarding this connection. As the classical literature 
explores the influence of tax revenues on shadow economy, we investigate the reverse 
relationship direction, from shadow economy to tax revenues. 
Our investigation is focused on the case of Africa. We choose this region because it includes 
developing countries, which are confronted with severe shadow economy phenomenon and 
low level of tax inputs. Even if the topic of shadow economy is prolific regarding the 
contributions for this geographical area (e.g. Tanzi, 1981; Leuthold, 1991; Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura, 1998), neither one has been interested in the implications of 
shadow economy on tax revenues. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 illustrates the methodology; Section 3 
describes the data, while the Section 4 illustrates the main results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Methodology 
 
The main hypothesis of this investigation claims that shadow economy has significant and 
positive impact on tax revenues share. In order to analyse this relationship we use the 
econometric tool. Two data-sets are used for the period 1999-2006: one which covers whole 
world, and another which includes African countries only. 
As first step, using the first sample, we estimate the following basic empirical model: 
 
,             (1) 
 
where Z = (z1,… zk) is the vector of control variables, while i represents the error term that is 
assumed to be normally and independently distributed.  is the intercept,  captures the 
effect of shadow economy and  = ( ) is the parameter vector for the control 
variables. The model is estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard 
errors.  
The second set of estimations, consider a transversal model approach, by entering the dummy 
variables, which capture geographical location (the continent). In this case, the model has the 
following form: 
 
(2) 
 
This estimation procedure integrates the regional dimension in order to understand the 
importance of the relationship between the two variables. We hypothesize that the effect of 
the informal economy can vary by region, which is captured by the interaction between the 
variable of interest and the continental dummy.  
The further step of empirical analysis captures the specific effects of each nation through 
panel-model investigation, with this form: 
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 ,  (3) 
 
where  i= 1,2,…N and  t=1,2,…T indicate the country and year, respectively.  
The homogeneity issue of panels is also treated. At this level, the regressions are performed 
with variables on African data only. At the same time, we also rewrite the equation 
introducing lagged of dependent variables. This leads to: 
 
,  (4) 
 
where  is the lagged-variable parameter,  is a vector of our control variables, including the 
informal economy,  is the error term,  represents the fixed effect temporal, and  is the 
fixed effect component. 
In order to deal with this possible endogeneity issue and to control for the bias as result of 
using of lagged dependent variable, a generalized method of moments (GMM) model is 
performed. The first popular GMM approach belongs to Arellano-Bond (1991) and is as a 
follows: 
 
   (5) 
 
The dynamic GMM estimator cannot reach the best estimations, as the lagged levels of the 
regressors are poor instruments for the first-differenced regressors. As a consequence, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) developed an augmented GMM new version, named GMM-
system. This kind of technique follows the levels of variables, as in equation (3), in order to 
explore two equations: one differenced and one in levels. The Sargan test is employed to 
check the validity of the considered instruments. AR(1) and AR(2) processes in the first 
differences tests are performed to detect the presence of autocorrelations. 
  
3. Data 
 
Two data-sets are used for analyse, covering the period 1999-2006: one which includes all 
world countries, and another which groups only the African countries (i.e. Algeria, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Congo Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Egypt, Arab Rep,, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, 
Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zambia). The descriptive statistics of 
sample in presented in Annexe 1. 
The tax revenue is the dependent variable and represents the volume of tax revenues as 
percentage of GDP, being obtained from World Bank. This variable is regularly used as 
dependent variable in many studies, such as: Ghura (1998), Piancastelli (2001), Eltony 
(2001), Tanzi (1981), Leuthold, (1991), Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Ghura (1998), and 
Bird et al. (2004). The shadow economy is used to measure the informal economy. The 
sources of data are the studies of Schneider (2010), whose theoretical bases are discussed 
including Schneider (2005a, 2005b, 2010). Using a cross-country panel analysis of 12 East-
European countries, Davoodi and Gregorian (2007) capture the tax potential and efforts in 
Armenia. The authors suggest that size of shadow economy and institutional quality are two 
significant factors that affect tax effectiveness. Haque (2012) also finds a negative correlation 
between the informal economy and tax effort. For the first estimations, we also consider the 
geographical location. In this case, the dummy variables are used for continents instead of the 
regional classification of countries (value 1 for considered continent, and 0 for the rest ones). 
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In order to isolate the effect of the interest variable, we include structural and institutional 
quality determinants.  
The first group includes variables, such as: per capita GDP (log), share of agriculture in GDP, 
and share of imports in GDP, according to Gupta (2007). This data come from World Bank.  
GDP per capita is a traditional indicator of economic development. Thus, it is expected that 
this indicator has a certain positive significant correlation with the tax performance. This 
hypothesis is plausible especially in virtue of the Wagner’s law. The sectorial composition is 
also an important element of taxation. In Africa, for example, the agricultural sector consists 
of agriculture substance, but the mining sector may be useful to generate significant tax 
revenues to the economy if these areas attract large companies. Chelliah (1971) identifies as 
explanatory variables for the tax share: the mining share, the non-mineral export ratio and the 
agriculture share. If the mining share has a positive impact on tax revenues, the agricultural 
share has a negative one. At the same time, many studies emphasize the role of openness on 
the income tax (e.g. Keen and Simone, 2004 and Rodrik, 1998). Lotz and Morss (1967) also 
find that per capita income and trade share are significant determinants of the tax share. This 
finding has been replicated by Piancastelli (2001), Chelliah et al. 9(1975), and Tait et al. 
(1979). Tanzi (1992) states that half of the variation in the tax ratio is explained by per capita 
income, import share, agriculture share and foreign debt share. The import share is positively 
correlated with the tax ratio. 
The second group of control determinants is related to institutional quality environment. The 
measures of institutional quality come from the dataset compile by Daniel Kaufmann, Art 
Kraay and Massimo Mastruzzi at the World Bank. This sample aggregates indicators of six 
broad dimensions of governance: Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. 
These six aggregate indicators are based on 30 underlying data sources reporting the 
perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents and expert assessments 
worldwide. We use the average of these measures of institutional quality. Several studies 
focus on the importance of institutional factors in determining of tax performance. For 
example, Bird et al. (2006) find factors, such as: corruption, rule of law, entry regulations play 
key roles. Corruption, voice and accountability also determine a positive significant impact on 
tax effort (Bird et al. 2008). On the same note, Besley and Person (2013) put in evidence the 
positive role of institutional quality in tax revenues collection.  
Finally, we note only the variables that are returned most often in the literature are used for 
our estimates.  
 
4. Econometric findings 
 
Figure 1 presents the scatter plot between tax revenues as percentage of GDP (y-axis) and 
shadow economy (x-axis) for the countries included in our first sample. The output clearly 
suggests the evidence of a negative relationship between these two variables, with correlation 
coefficient of 0.27, a strong statistically significant (at 1%). 
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Figure 1. The correlation between tax revenues and shadow economy 
 
 
In Figure 1, the tax revenues are plotted against shadow economy. It follows that countries 
with higher shadow economy enjoy weak mobilization of tax revenues. We also represent the 
fitted line for the simple regression model. The estimated coefficient for  is negative (-.145) 
and strongly significant (p-value = 0.000), indicating that high shadow economy reduces tax 
revenue. 
It is worthwhile to test its solidity with an empirical assessment. This is the objective of the 
following table 1. 
 
Table 1. Main results 
Dependent variables: tax revenues as % of GDP. 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
Shadow 
economy 
-.145***    
(.046) 
-.080   
(.079) 
-.023   
(.069) 
-.091   
(.096) 
-.269*   
(.155) 
-.042   
(.0766) 
-.059   
(.076) 
Log GDP per 
capita 
 .860   
(2.109) 
2.432   
(1.477) 
.837   
(2.197) 
-1.109   
(2.637) 
-.384   
(2.411) 
.491   
(2.136) 
Import share   .079   
(.057) 
.063    
(.047) 
.073   
(.060) 
.080**   
(.040) 
.072   
(.055) 
.088     
(.058) 
Agriculture 
share   
 -.071   
(.142) 
-.059   
(.108) 
-.085   
(.168) 
-.140   
(.157) 
-.117   
(.154) 
-.095 
(.143) 
Governance  -.165   
(.946) 
-.244   
(.930) 
-.175   
(.961) 
.029   (.692) .092   
(.870) 
-.514 
(.945) 
Africa   35.9136**   
(16.588) 
    
Americas     -6.564**   
(3.300) 
   
Asia      -14.728**    
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(6.760) 
Europa       8.680   
(5.392) 
 
Oceania        65.568***   
(14.658) 
Schadow * 
Africa 
  -.777*   
(.424) 
    
Schadow * 
Americas  
   .142   
(.091) 
   
Schadow * 
Asia  
    .319*   
(.184) 
  
Schadow * 
Europa   
     -.213    
(.143) 
 
Schadow * 
Oceania  
      -4.191***   
(1.042) 
Cons 20.692***   
(1.853) 
8.749   
(21.301) 
-7.586   
(15.072) 
9.984   
(22.153) 
34.572   
(29.059) 
18.558   
(23.219) 
11.033   
(21.392) 
R² 0.0712 0.2245 0.3309 0.2390 0.3661 0.2695 0.2762 
Obs 104 69 69 69 69 69 69 
Note: All regressions are estimated using White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction. 
 
Table 1 shows the basic estimates of this work. In the first column, the results of the simple 
regression between the dependent variable and the dependent variable reinforce the output of 
Figure 1. In the second column, we control for other variables to minimize the bias of 
omission. We realize that the variable of interest is no longer significant, and indeed, none of 
the variables appears significant in this regression. In the next specifications, we consider 
different continents, assuming that the relationship find in the model can be located in one or 
more such as areas.  
In this case, in the third column, the dummy for Africa has a significant and positive 
coefficient. The crossing of the dummy to the variable of interest is also significant with a 
negative sign. This means that in Africa the size of the informal economy is detrimental to 
taxes. The model IV reveals that the dummy of America is also significant, but its crossing 
with the informal economy is not. The case of Asia is revealed in the fifth column and also 
changes the configuration of the previous results in the sense that the informal economy and 
import variables become significant. Moreover, the dummy of Asia has a negative and 
significant sign, while the crossing of dummy with the informal economy is significant but 
positively correlated with depended variable. The introduction of Europe generates non-
conclusive results. On the contrary, the Oceania registers the same results as those found in 
Africa. The differences in findings between Africa, Asia and Oceania, require further 
consideration.  
Indeed, in Tables 2, using the African sample, we consider both the problem of fixed effects 
for each country in its respective continent, but also the issue of endogeity between the 
informal economy and tax revenues. Many studies have established that the taxation has 
important implication in the size of the informal economy (e.g. Schneider, 2000; and Johnson 
et al., 1998).  
As a first step, we estimate the effect of the informal economy in a naive panel regression 
with fixed effect and random effect (models 1 and 3). We note that the obtained results 
confirm the previously one for Africa: the informal economy affects negatively the resulting 
revenues of taxes. We find that in the case of the random-effects model, the magnitude of the 
coefficient is almost double comparatively with the fixed effect.  
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Further, in the models 2 and 4, we introduce the control variables. All coefficients behave 
similarly regardless of the model chosen, but in the case of fixed-effects model 2, only the 
import share is significant, while the interest determinant is not conclusive. However, in the 
random effects model, these two variables are statistically different from zero. The agriculture 
share also becomes significant, with negative sign in respect to the tax revenues. 
 
Table 2. The main estimation results for Africa 
Dependent Variable: Tax revenues as % of GDP. 
 
Variable Fixed 
Effects 
Fixed  
Effects 
Random 
effects 
 
Random 
effects 
 
Diff.- 
GMM 
System 
GMM 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Shadow economy -.384** 
(0.191) 
-.049 
(.367) 
-.688*** 
(0.143) 
-.351**   
(.169) 
-3.127** 
(1.623) 
-.301**     
(.135) 
Import share  .116*** 
(.029) 
 
 
.098***    
(.026) 
.024 
(.041) 
.0151   
(.014) 
Agriculture share  -.086 
(.097) 
 
 
-.149**   
(.083) 
.140   
(.121) 
-.139**     
(.066) 
Governance  .003 
(.016) 
 
 
.009   
(.014) 
-.001   
(.019) 
-.002   
(.008) 
Log_GDP_per_capita  .013 
(.054) 
 
 
.008   
(.019) 
-.358   
(.265) 
-.030**     
(.0136) 
Tax_rev(-1)     -.012   
(.231) 
.841***     
(.071) 
Obs 158 154 158 154 100 124 
N 29 28 29 28 22 24 
Instruments     18 46 
AR(1)  Pr > z     0.829 0.000 
AR(2) Pr > z     0.110 0.329 
Sargan test (Prob> chi2)     0.067 0.230 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *, **, ***: significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. All 
regressions are estimated using constant term. 
 
All these results have a problem in interpretation due to reverse causality of the majority of 
our variables. We deal with this issue performing the GMM-dynamic and GMM-system 
estimations (models 5 and 6). Two both GMM estimators reveal that the interest variable is 
significant and negatively correlated with tax revenues share. More precisely, the increase in 
the size of the informal economy reduces tax revenues in African countries. However, the 
Sargan-Hansen tests associated with our estimates validate the instruments of the model, at 
limit in the case of GMM-dynamic. Moreover, it may be noted that there is no second-order 
autocorrelation for both models. As noted, the GMM-system estimator is better is more 
powerful than the first difference because it gives biased results in small samples in presence 
of weak instruments.  
Considering for our analysis this last estimator, the main findings show that the interest 
variable is significant and has negative sign. The same results reveal the import share and 
GDP per capita. If the first case confirms the main outputs in the literature, the second one has 
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a contrary sign. This can be the result of the extension of tax base (i.e. the GDP per capita is 
the main tax base for tax revenues), without any legal tax ratio modification. The rest of 
determinants are not conclusive. 
 
Concluding, the main results of our investigation show that, in the case of considered African 
countries, for the period 1999-2007, the shadow economy has a significant and negative 
impact of tax revenues share. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Shadow economy represents a complex and destructive phenomenon for whole world, 
especially for the developing countries. Investigating several economies from Sub-Saharan 
Africa by using a panel model approach, for the period 1999-2007, we find that the shadow 
economy has a significant influence of tax revenues, the variables being negatively correlated. 
More precisely, any extension of the shadow economy determines a decrease of the tax 
revenues level and vice-versa. In this case, the diminution of tax inputs is the result of tax 
base compressing and has two main explanations. First one reveals that the tax base decreases 
as the effect of tax evasion increasing (i.e. the taxpayers are officially registered but do not 
declare the tax base), while the second one argues that the reduction of tax base has origins in 
the extension of unofficial economy (i.e. the taxpayers do not exist officially, individuals and 
companies “operating” directly in the “black” economic area).  
The policy implications of these outputs show that the Sub-Saharan African governments, in 
order to maximise the collected tax revenues, should better “control” the shadow economy 
phenomenon. This means that the primordial governmental objective is the reduction of 
shadow economy, through two channels. The first channel claims an improvement of laws 
regarding the prevention and punishment of tax evasion, in parallel with a severe tax controls. 
The second channel assumes corrective tax measures in order to stimulate the individuals and 
companies to pass from “black economy” to the official zone.  
All these policy coordinates will increase the tax base “visibility”, extending the tax base, 
with positive impact on tax revenues.       
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Annexes 1.  Summary statistics 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Schadow economy 382     .4025445 .0680624 .219 .59 
Log GDP per capita 387     7.337708 .9864477 5.512981 10.268 
Import share  378     .4192161 .202291 .1456259 1.427436 
Agriculture share   367     .2710156 .1665489 .0181917 .8007458 
Governance 387    -.5976752 .5621785 -1.89954 1.249669 
Tax revenu 161     .1586098 .0988902 .0011668 .6101812 
 
 
